Balochistan is the largest province (44%) of Pakistan by area. It is remotely populated with multiple ethnicities, including Baloch, Pashtuns, Hazaras, and Punjabi migrants. The socio-economic condition in the province has been deteriorating until the beginning of CPEC-related projects, including Gwadar. The political landscape of the province has been reflecting the ethnic distribution of the population. It has also been influenced by the tribal systems. However, the emergence of the middle class in the province and rapid urbanization have weakened ethnocentric politics to some extent.
Balochistan has been a political anomaly. The root cause of the current situation can be traced back to the decolonization process of British India. The legal provision for ‘princely states’ to choose India, Pakistan, or independence provided the Khan of Kalat the option to remain independent. However, in 1948, he announced joining Pakistan after the rulers of Lasbela and Kharan had decided to join Pakistan. His announcement led his brother Prince Karim to take arms against the state of Pakistan in 1948. It was the beginning of the first insurgency, which died down sooner.
Consequently, the second and third insurgencies were again a response to the administrative decisions of the federal government i.e., the ‘one-unit formula’ and the martial law of Ayub Khan. The first three insurgencies were limited to Sardars of Baloch tribes who had rebelled against the state, claiming an insufficient share in the natural resources of the province. However, the state did not respond militarily, and these insurgencies died down subsequently.
The fourth and fifth insurgencies in Balochistan have proven deadly. The fourth insurgency started in 1973 and was dealt with through military operations and the imposition of martial law. There were more casualties wherein 3300 AFs personnel were martyred and 5300 insurgents were killed from 1973 to 1978. The overthrow of ZAB’s government and the imposition of martial law changed the landscape of the province. The military governor, Lt Gen Rahimuddin Khan, announced a general amnesty, ending the military operation and starting a process of restitution and reparation through economic aid and development projects.
The general amnesty, however, succeeded in ending a severe crisis in the federation of Pakistan at a time when the country was passing through a post-disemberment phase. It not only neutralized the insurgent leaders but also pacified the Baloch people by giving them leadership like NAB. The post-amnesty development process was internationally recognized because Rahimuddin Khan insisted that foreign donors and aid to invest in the infrastructural and social development of the province. Furthermore, the amnesty was more sustainable as it did not lead to another insurgency for 25 years until 2003.
The fifth insurgency is the longest, deadliest, and most costly as compared to all the previous insurgencies. It started in 2003 and was triggered in 2007 after the killing of NAB. The recent wave has expanded throughout the province. The landscape of Baloch subnationalists has changed from separatism to terrorism, with some newly raised organizations adopting suicide bombing as a tool of resistance. The recent attacks in Lahore, Karachi, and some parts of Balochistan confirm a change of tactics by the Baloch separatists. This has damaged the political cause.
Policymakers in Pakistan have been debating the Balochistan issue for conflict resolution. History suggests that Pakistan experimented with both options; reconciliation and general amnesty. Both the processes of amnesty and reconciliation are generally practiced worldwide as both are complementary to each other. In some cases, amnesty is granted through reconciliation, and in some cases, the reconciliation process is supported through general or selective amnesty. A comparative study of amnesty and reconciliation will unfold the horizons for policymakers to make rational choices in Balochistan.
States and non-state actors cannot coexist. However, the first step towards conflict resolution is always the responsibility of the state, as it claims to be the custodian of the order. The state maintains a bare minimum deterrence from within to avoid any kind of internal unrest while searching for means to resolve the issues. Therefore, the government, as a representative of the state, needs to create suitable conditions and an environment to convince its population that it will take care of its interests.
The economic deprivations of the federating units do not have a security-centric solution. Rather, it requires a developmental approach with the provision of constitutional rights. Despite the fact that administrative division in Balochistan is much more ideal than the other provinces, it needs political solutions. With 35 districts and 8 divisions, the province has a population of 20 million. On the other hand, Punjab has 42 districts with a population of more than 120 million. The comparison of Balochistan with Punjab and the rest of the provinces illustrates that the state should be approaching the Baloch population much more easily than the rest of the country. However, this is not the case.
As the CPEC is seen as central to the population of Pakistan, it has more dividends for Balochistan. However, these dividends are possible only when the federation adopts an all-encompassing approach to accommodate all the state subjects. The exclusive approach is not a one-sided affair; rather, ethnic groups also need to be exclusive to maintain the spirit of federalism. If one ethnic group feels that it is deprived because of another ethnic group and adopts violence as a means against every other group, it will create a vicious cycle of disintegration. Hence, the state has to intervene in the infightings to maintain order.
The economic dividends depend on rightly placed political priorities. The government of Pakistan is in a quest to maintain law and order in the province while terming CPEC as the flagship project of national development. A historical trend of insurgencies in Balochistan suggests that decision-makers need to choose between reconciliation and amnesty. As the general amnesty in 1979 was more enduring and lasting, the state of Pakistan should start thinking along these lines to make a political decision with the consent of all stakeholders.
