What commenced with the construction of a controversial bunker (morcha) in Boshera in Kurram District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on September 20, 2024, eventually snowballed into a full-scale humanitarian crisis, leaving dozens dead, hundreds injured, thousands displaced, and entire communities disconnected.
Still, peace remains on shaky ground, with no end in sight.
Entrenched in a devastating conflict over the past several months, Kurram District—which serves as a connecting link, bordering three Afghan provinces: Khost, Paktia, and Nangarhar (Tora Bora)—has witnessed sectarian strife between Sunni and Shia communities, heating up with each passing day.
The mayhem was fuelled by a series of violent clashes, land disputes, and the emergence of extremist factions.
The Spark that Lit the Fire
On September 20, 2024, tensions erupted when the Boshera-based Sunni tribes—Mangal and Bangash—constructed a bunker in an area owned by Ahmedzai, a sub-clan of the Shia Tori tribe.
The strategic placement of the bunker within Shia territory in Boshera, the town surrounded by Shia areas, was seen as a provocative move. Abid Malyar, a prominent Bangash tribesman, hailing from Sunni sect, confirms that the bunker was built on land belonging to the Shia Ahmedzai Toris, prompting immediate backlash from local Shia leaders.
Subsequently, a jirga, comprising elders from both sides, was convened the same day which declared the bunker illegal, ordering its demolition.
In an unfortunate turn of events, a blast took place on the same day, fuelling a wave of rumours, though no casualties were reported. Some speculated that the people of Boshera, angered by the jirga’s decision, blasted the bomb. Others pointed fingers at the Shia community. Amidst this, a message rapidly circulated among both sects that the opposing group was preparing to launch an offensive.
Subsequently, both sects began trading gunfire, which continued for nine days, resulting in the deaths of at least 45 people and around 150 injuries. The majority of casualties were Shia, with rough estimates indicating 37 Shia deaths compared to eight Sunnis.
According to a conspiracy theory, the true death toll remains unclear, as both sects, unlike before, are downplaying the number of casualties on their respective sides. “In reality, it was the Taliban-backed Sunnis and activists of the proscribed Zainabiyoun, who support the Shias, that were killed in the conflict, and both sides are concealing their identities,” says a young tribesman from Sadda in Kurram District.
He prefers to remain anonymous, because “my objective views on the issue may make me a target of extremist groups.” He refers to Irshad Husain Qalandar, a known Zainabiyoun activist, who was killed in clashes on October 12. This lends credence to the assertion, suggesting the involvement of Zainabiyoun in the violent events.
Locked in a Dead End
Kurram District is divided into three administrative divisions: Lower Kurram, Central Kurram, and Upper Kurram. As the conflict worsened, roads connecting Kurram to the outside world were blocked, further isolating the district.
In the Shia-dominated Upper Kurram, Sunni tribes such as Mangal, Kharoti, Zazi, Muqbal, Zadran, and Ghalji reside along the border area and must pass through the Shia-populated Parachinar to reach the rest of the country.
Similarly, the Shia Bangash and Toris of Upper Kurram must traverse the Sunni-dominated Sadda town to travel outside the district.
The Sunnis of Sadda, in turn, have to pass through the Shia village of Alizai to leave the district, while the Shia residents of Alizai face Sunni-controlled Bagan while travelling down country.
All these vital routes were blocked following the September 20 clashes in Boshera.
A Vicious Cycle of Violence
On October 12, 2024, a Sadda-bound convoy, primarily consisting of Sunnis, was ambushed in the Shia-dominated area of Kunj Alizai, leaving 18 dead, including women and children.
The attack is believed to have been triggered by a rumour circulating in Kunj Alizai that day. Unverified reports—which later proved to be fake—suggested that three Shia tribesmen, who had gone hunting in a nearby forest, were killed by Sunni tribesmen.
The Shia community condemned the incident, demanding that the perpetrators be arrested by the government. On the other hand, Sunni elders provided a list of 46 individuals of Kunj Alizai and Nastikhel allegedly responsible for the attack.
The Shia tribesmen, nevertheless, refused to surrender the alleged perpetrators of the attack to the government. They argued that the government should arrest them itself, as the abolition of the Frontier Crimes Regulation in May 2018 meant the tribe was no longer legally obligated to hand over criminals under the principle of collective or territorial responsibility.
As roads remained blocked and tensions intensified, the violence continued to escalate. On November 21, 2024, a Shia convoy travelling towards Parachinar was ambushed at Mandori and Uchat areas, both predominantly inhabited by Sunnis, resulting in 44 deaths.
The attack triggered a retaliatory response from a Shia lashkar (private militia) of approximately 10,000 armed individuals, who launched an assault on the Sunni village of Bagan, Talo Kunj and Badshah the next day. The attack resulted in 23 fatalities: 17 Sunnis and eight from the attacking Shia lashkar. The destruction of 700 shops and 800 homes further inflamed hostilities.
The Bagan assault marked a significant turning point in the conflict. The violence reached several areas, including Sadda, Khwaar Kalay, and Trimangal.
But there were no clashes in Boshera, where the initial conflict had begun.
“On November 22, Shia armed men attacked us. They set fire to 500 shops and around 800 homes,” says Malik Iqbal Badshah, a prominent tribal elder of Bagan. He sounds extremely annoyed over the “discriminatory” behaviour of the government. “The Shia laskhar travelled from 70 kilometres away to bring destruction to our villages, and the government stood by as silent spectators. They torched Sunni villages in Talu Kunj, Bagan, and Badshah Kot.”
A Thin Thread of Peace
By January 1, 2025, after weeks of fighting, a ceasefire was brokered. The seven-page peace agreement, endorsed by both warring parties and the Grand Jirga, focuses on upholding previous agreements, ensuring the repatriation of displaced persons, and resolving land disputes. Key provisions include banning weapons, preventing sectarian violence, and destroying existing bunkers.
Despite this peace agreement, not all parties were satisfied. The Watizai tribesmen of Bagan, feeling that their suffering had been ignored, refused to accept the terms of the agreement. They staged a sit-in at Mandori, blocking critical roadways and preventing movement outside the district, which still continues. Their demands included further action against the perpetrators of the Bagan attack and the provision of adequate compensation for those affected.
The Storm Rages on
In mid-January, the region witnessed renewed violence when a 35-vehicle convoy carrying food and supplies to Bagan was attacked, killing 18 people and setting 15 trucks on fire. Security forces responded swiftly by launching an operation in Bagan on January 19, 2025, which is ongoing.
The violence has sparked outrage from the local population, who feel abandoned by the government. Tribesmen in Bagan, like Din Gul, a school owner whose institution was burned down in November 22 attack by Shia lashkar, have voiced their anger over the government’s failure to protect them.
The compensation packages, they argue, are insufficient to rebuild their homes or restore their lives.
“Our houses were torched, our elderly people and children are spending freezing nights in the tents, but the government is taking goods-laden vehicles to Parachinar, the aggressors,” Gul says.
The Apple of Discord: The Land Ownership or Sectarian Schisms
The land issue, particularly regarding communal land (Shamilat) in Kurram, remains a critical point of contention. According to local leaders, resolving these disputes could significantly reduce the sectarian tensions that have simmered in the district for decades.
For instance, on June 28, 2020, a violent clash erupted over a land dispute in Balishkhel in Kurram District, resulting in the deaths of 15 people and leaving nearly 40 injured. What is particularly striking about this conflict is the rare and unexpected alliance formed between Sunni tribes and the Shia community to fight against their own Sunni counterparts.
The Shia Torri tribe’s branch, Gundikhel, backed by the Sunni Ghrabeena tribe of Khar Kalay, exchanged heavy gunfire with the Sunni Para Chamkani tribe, all over ownership of communal land.
The land in question, spanning nearly four thousand acres, is officially recorded as belonging to the Gundikhel tribe. However, the Sunni Ghrabeena tribe, which holds a one-seventh share of the land, joined hands with the Shia Gundi Khel tribe in the dispute, fighting alongside them both in legal battles and armed skirmishes. This unprecedented alliance highlights how land disputes in the region often transcend sectarian lines, with both Sunni and Shia tribes uniting against a common adversary.
Syed Raza Hussain, a Shia tribal elder based in Parachinar, believes that land disputes between various communities in the region is the root cause of the sectarian bloodbath in Kurram District.
He says that one major issue involves the Mangals of Pewar (Sunnis) and the Toris of Alizai (Shias), who are locked in a dispute over the ownership of a forest. Similarly, tensions exist between the Shia and Sunni Bangash tribes in Dunder and Boshera, who have long-standing land disagreements.
In Balishkhel, the Hamzakhel and Mastokhel Shia tribes are in conflict with the Sunni Bangash tribe over land ownership. Other disputes include a land conflict between the Ghundikhel Shias of Kunj Alizai and the Sunni Muqbal tribe over the Shamilat of Kunj Alizai, and another dispute between the Ghundikhel Shias espoused by Gharbeensa Sunnis and Para Chamkani Sunnis over Balishkhel land.
To settle these disputes, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government constituted a committee in November 2023, led by Senior Member of the Board of Revenue Amir Lateef.
The committee was composed of representatives from both Shia and Sunni communities, each having equal representation of 15 members, including Syed Raza Hussain, who represented the Shia side.
However, the committee came out with a report on land disputes in areas such as Gedu, Boshehra, Dandar, and Kunj Alizai was rejected by the Shia representatives. “The committee failed to address the particularly sensitive issue of Balishkhel, which he likened to a “Kashmir-like” problem, fueling unrest across the district,” says Hussain.
Mufti Noor Badshah, a Sunni cleric based in Sadda town, emphasises that while sectarianism exacerbates the situation, the underlying causes of these conflicts are often economic and personal in nature.
“Religious differences are often manipulated to stoke the flames of personal grievances into full-blown sectarian violence,” said Badshah while talking to this scribe a few years back at his madrassa in Sadda.
