ISLAMABAD: The deepening collaboration between Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) marks a major shift in Pakistan’s security landscape.
Once considered ideologically opposed, these groups have now found common ground in their opposition to the Pakistani state.
Interviews with Pakistani security officials and senior Afghan Taliban commanders reveal that both TTP and BLA operate from Afghan soil, taking advantage of safe havens to plan and execute attacks.
This evolving partnership has raised alarms in Islamabad, as it complicates counterterrorism efforts and threatens regional stability.
From hunted to sheltered
The TTP’s reliance on Afghan territory for sanctuary is not new. Before the Afghan Taliban’s takeover of Kabul, Pakistani Taliban fighters would cross into Afghanistan to escape military operations. However, their movements were constrained due to US-led drone strikes, which targeted their hideouts in coordination with Pakistani intelligence, keeping them on the back foot.
As a result, TTP militants were constantly on the move, unable to establish long-term safe havens.
That changed when the Afghan Taliban came to power on August 15, 2021.
The TTP now enjoys unprecedented freedom, with its fighters and their families settled in eastern Afghan provinces such as Khost, Paktika, Paktia, and Kunar.
These regions, once hostile to them, have become secure bases where they regroup after carrying out attacks in Pakistan, according to a TTP commander who declined to be named. Many senior Afghan Taliban figures, in particular, act as TTP’s protectors, facilitating their operations across the border.
New safe havens
A Quetta-based intelligence official tells WE News English that the Baloch insurgency, led by groups like the BLA, has historically operated within Pakistan’s borders. However, after intensified military operations in Balochistan, many fighters packed their bags and sought refuge in Afghanistan, he adds.
“Initially, BLA operatives were based in Kandahar and surrounding areas, but their presence there was short-lived. Unlike TTP, which enjoys ideological and operational support from the Afghan Taliban, the BLA has faced hostility from them.” Several key BLA leaders were assassinated in Kandahar by unknown attackers, believed to be acting with the tacit approval of the Afghan Taliban, sealing their fate in their area of dominance.
Following these setbacks, the BLA leadership relocated to Nimroz in southwestern Afghanistan bordering Iran and Pakistan, as well as Helmand—a province in southern Afghanistan adjacent to Balochistan—where they operate with greater autonomy, according to a TTP commander.
Intelligence sources indicate that after carrying out attacks in Pakistan, BLA fighters contact their commanders in Nimroz, with intercepted calls confirming these links. This suggests that the group maintains a well-organised command structure from within Afghan territory.
Collaboration over differences
Pakistani security officials believe that despite their ideological differences, the TTP and BLA have established a working relationship, primarily based on operational needs. Intelligence-sharing and logistical coordination between the two groups have become increasingly common.
A Pakistani security official says that the TTP, with its vast experience in insurgency tactics and access to advanced weaponry, has reportedly sold arms, including American-made weapons, to the BLA.
There is also speculation that the BLA has acquired suicide bombers from the TTP. Historically, militant groups have traded suicide operatives, with financially stronger factions financing such transactions. “Indian intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) is supporting and financing them,” the security official says.
BLA is believed to have purchased trained attackers from the TTP for specific missions. Pakistani Taliban sources confirm that information-sharing between the two groups is a routine practice, further strengthening their operational capabilities.
Insurgents-favouring terrain
Pakistan has made significant efforts to secure its western border, including the construction of a border fence along the 2,590-kilometer-long Pak-Afghan border. However, these measures have not completely halted militant movement, as insurgents continue to slip through cracks.
Despite tightened controls at official crossings like Torkham and Spin Boldak, insurgents continue to exploit mountainous terrain and unregulated routes along the Pak-Afghan border.
The porous nature of the border is particularly concerning in Balochistan, where the TTP has established strongholds in Pashtun-majority regions. Reports indicate a growing TTP presence in the Pashtun belt of Balochistan such as Qila Saifullah, Pishin, Ziarat, and Quetta.
The vast, rugged landscape of Balochistan provides militants with ample hiding spaces, making counterinsurgency efforts difficult. The presence of Baloch militants in Afghanistan remains a major concern for Pakistan.
Beyond borders
The evolving nexus between TTP and BLA underscores a new and complex security challenge for Pakistan. While the Afghan Taliban’s relationship with the TTP is rooted in longstanding alliances and shared struggles, the BLA’s increasing dependence on external support has brought it into an unlikely collaboration with Islamist militants.
As both groups refine their strategies and strengthen their networks, Pakistan faces an uphill battle in countering their activities.
The threat is no longer limited to isolated attacks—it is an organised cross-border terrorism that could have far-reaching consequences for regional stability.
Conflicting estimates
The actual number of militant groups and their fighters has always been a subject of conflicting claims. Initially, official estimates suggested that the BLA and its faction, the Majeed Brigade, had around 1,200 fighters.
The Majeed Brigade, the suicide squad of BLA, was reportedly formed in early 2010s. It gained prominence in 2018 when it carried out a high-profile attack on the Chinese consulate in Karachi. The brigade is named after Majeed Baloch, a member of the Baloch Student Organisation (BSO).
Over the past few years, particularly since the emergence of the Majeed Brigade, the ranks of these groups have grown. A conservative estimate, shared with WE News English by a security official, places the combined strength of BLA and its allied factions between 5,000 and 7,000 fighters.
As far as actual number of TTP is concerned, it is also difficult to determine with certainty. Earlier estimates suggested their strength exceeded 10,000. However, following mergers with various splinter groups, their numbers have likely increased. Current estimates suggest their strength could be around 12,000 to 15,000, the security official adds.
Additionally, groups such as Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s faction and others operate separately, with an estimated strength of over 5,000 fighters. When combined, these figures indicate that the total number of Pakistani Taliban and affiliated groups exceeds 20,000.
